


The Moon race from the other side of the Iron Curtain

Astronomy and Space Science www.csiro.au



"Rockets and People" by Boris Chertok




Борис Черток Boris Chertok (1912-2011)

• Extensive memoirs: Four books about the Soviet space program called

"Rockets and People"

- The 4th book is about the Moon Race
- English translation done by the NASA's History Division



Rockets and People, Volume 4

Credits: NASA

PDF is available for free at the NASA website:

https://www.nasa.gov/connect/ebooks/rockets_people_vol4_detail.html

Let's start with some names first




Сергей Королёв Sergei Korolev (1907(6) – 1966)

Other spellings of the name exist: e.g. Korolyov



Bасилий Мишин Vasiliy Mishin (1917 – 2001)



Bалентин Глушко Valentin Glushko (1908 – 1989)



Some problems of powerful rocket engines

- Gas dynamics, oscillations & resonances
- Ignition sequence
- Throttling
- Single start vs. ability to reuse

Fuel & oxidizer pair matters! kerosene + liquid oxygen (LOX) is not the easiest pair

Problems rapidly increase with engine power



NK-15 engines in the Aviation and Space museum in Moscow



Some Soviet Rockets

@LEO: ~5-7 tons


~25 tons ~95 tons

~100 tons


R-7, modern Soyuz (In Russian: P-7) Sputnik, Gagarin, Luna-9, etc UR-500K (in Russian: YP-500K) N1 modern Proton

e.g., Zond/L1, E-8

Energia




I won't talk about Ye-8 (E-8 in Russian), etc




N1-L3 (H1-Л3 in Russian) Launcher + lunar spacecraft

- Paper project in late 1950s
 - Just N1, no specific payload
 - Mass at launch 2200 tons
 - Spherical tanks
 - 75 tons at low Earth orbit (LEO)
 - Intermediate step N11 rocket
 - Kuznetsov NK-15 engines (blocks A and B), NK-9 (block V)
 - Differential thrust control in 2 axes
- 13th May 1961 political decision to build N1 by 1965
 - Not a very self-consistent plan
 - Defence (kind of CDR) of the N1 project 16th May 1962.
 - Go ahead 24th September 1962



Till the end of 1963 – plan for 3 N1 launches

- Design of the lunar spacecraft itself seriously started only in 1963
- A 3-launch initial approach (actually 4, people would be launched with R-7) would give a good reserve in weights:
 - send 21 tons spacecraft to the Moon and return 5 tons back to Earth



N1-L3 (H1-Л3 in Russian) in August 1964

- 75 -> 93 tons @ LEO
 - Add 6 engines in the inner ring
 - 24 outer engines as they were
 - 8 at the second stage, 4 at the third
 - 680 tons of kerosene, 1780 tons of LOX (take off weight 2750 tons)
 - 2 cosmonauts, 1 gets to the Moon
 - Due date shifted only to 1966!
- More or less self-consistent design by December 1965
 - 60V 1000 Hz 3 phase AC power
 - KORD monitor and shutdown engines before they explode
- Start testing before 1969 is unlikely, mission itself 1972?



First launch – 21 February 1969

- First seconds of flight two engines (out of 30) shut down
- 69th second of the flight flame out on all engines
- Rocket crashed 52km from the launch site
- Investigation quickly revealed that the engines were shut down by KORD, but details not clear till March
- Engine #6 (and then #24) –
 false alarm due to interference
- 6th second burst pipe of oxygen pressure sensor
- 25th second burst pipe of the fuel pressure sensor
- 55th second mixture ignited
- 68th second fire broke wire isolation, 1000 Hz got to KORD control signals -> shut down



Second launch – 3 June 1969

- About 0.25s before lift off, engine #8 exploded
- Remaining engines worked for a bit and the rocket took off to about 200 m
- In 12s all but engine #18 were off, the rocket started to twist
- At 15th emergency ejection triggered
- At 23rd second the rocket crashed at the launch pad destroying it



More than a year to rebuild the launch pad

Later on, engine shutdown was blocked in first 50s

Lunar spacecraft tests in 1970-1971

- Three flights to the low Earth orbit to test both lunar lander and lunar orbital spacecraft
- Insertion with other carrier rockets



Third launch – 27 June 1971

- All engines started normally, but 5s into the flight roll angle started to increase
- At 14th second the roll angle exceeded 8 deg, but shutdown inhibited (for 50s)
- In 12s all but engine #18 were off, the rocket started to twist
- At 50th s the rocket had spun ~60 deg, all engines shut down -> crashed 20km away



It took a while to find the cause



Unexpected gas dynamics issue which was not in the model – not enough roll control

The last (4th) launch – 23 November 1972

- Essentially a new rocket, but decision made not to wait for the new engines (still about year 1.5 years) and install them from the next rocket
- New fire suppression system, new telemetry system, 4 more control engines
- Two on-board computers + standard upper stages
 - Wonders of s/w development and commissioning



- 95s central engines shut down as expected
- 100s flight normal
- 110s loss of information
- Separation was expected to take place at 113s

 Engine #4 explosion at 106.9s

The end of N1-L3

- 21 May 1974 reorganisation, Glushko appointed as the Chief
 - The first order was to cancel N1 program. Looked like it was pushed through.
 - Lots of impact on the industry. Hints that it was not decided yet higher up
- Formal government decision to terminate the N1-L3 program didn't appear until February 1976



- Didn't give up on the Moon, new rockets suggested
 - Even super-rocket capable of inserting 250 tons
- Lunar base was still a plan, but strong push for an analogue of Space Shuttle
- Fear it would delay having a super-heavy launcher by another 6-7 years
 - It took almost 13

Why did the project fail?

- Technical reasons
 - Engines not reaching acceptable levels of reliability for 10+ years
 - single use requirement complicated acceptance testing
 - No ground testing of the assembled first stage
 - Single-launch approach making rocket not suitable for the mission
 - Time lost for modifications (6 more engines to get 95 vs. 75 tons)
 - Weight crisis (aggravated by no H+LOX upper stages)
- Managerial issues
 - No single governing body, multiple competing companies instead
 - Many lines of development using different technology
 - Project under-resourced, costs under-estimated, unrealistic deadlines
 - Personalities & conflicts
- Politics
 - Not building N11 rocket no early testbed
 - No strategic decision to focus on the N1-L3 project until late in the game
 - Competition with military programs
 - Change of political government mid-60s



Thank you

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